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This study observes the nature of asset specificity in different Information Technology (IT) outsourcing 
typologies, and investigates the relevance of accounting and non-accounting numbers in relation to these 
outsourcing typologies, with consideration to the findings of literatures concerning Transaction Cost 
Economics Theory and Social Capital Theory. It represents a response to the lack of research on relationships 
of IT outsourcing engagements.  A case study research method is used to analyse the effect of asset 
specificity on the nature of relationship, and the use of accounting and non-accounting information in 
supporting the decision making processes of the Outsourcing Service Provider. Contrary to the findings of 
many researchers, the outsourcing-service provider adopted an integrative approach to its relationships as 
opposed to a distributive approach even in engagements that were highly asset specific, and short-term in 
duration. Additionally, the nature of asset specificity for IT outsourcing engagements is not static, but 
dynamic and in continual flux. Overall, this study suggests that large IT outsourcing-service providers value 
non-accounting factors in decision-making processes, in addition to accounting information, thus reflecting 
the Integrative Outsourcing Typology. This further validated the fact that factors advocated by Social Capital 
Theory such as corporate reputation, trust and collaborative interactions are crucial in IT outsourcing 
relationships.  
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This study observes the nature of asset specificity in Information Technology (IT) Outsourcing typologies, 
and evaluates the relevance of accounting and non-accounting numbers in relation to these outsourcing 
typologies (Figure 1).  The increased importance of outsourcing has received much attention in the literature 
(Kohler, 2000), largely due to the fact that it remains one of the most sustained trends within business over 
the last couple of decades .  Resources spent in developing, maintaining and upgrading in-house IT functions 
arguably affects the resources that firms direct towards their core activities. To avoid such sub-optimal 
allocation of resources, many firms resort to outsourcing their IT functions to specialist service providers, 
whoare able to provide specialised IT services at a lower cost. IT outsourcing allows businesses to seek 
higher levels of efficiency and effectiveness (Ngwenyama and Bryson, 1999). Given the nature of this 
competitive market, successful and established outsourcing-service providers are able to provide effective 
services at a fraction of the in-house cost (Harris, Giunipero and Hult, 1998; Klopack, 2000).  
 
In line with previous research, this study uses the term ‘outsourcer’ in reference to the firm that opts to 
outsource its internal IT function to an external party, and the term  ‘outsourcing-service provider’ in 
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Motivation & Contribution  
 
This study makes a threefold contribution to the IT outsourcing literature. First, the study focuses on 
outsourcing-service providers rather than outsourcers. Past research has predominantly focused on 
outsourcers and the benefits derived and/or costs incurred from their decision to outsource (Grover et al., 
1996; Harris et al., 1998; Klopack, 2000), but little research has focused on the outsourcing-service provider. 
A possible explanation for this lack of research is the difficulty in obtaining information from outsourcing-
service providers. This study benefits from the availability of confidential information from the Commercial 
Director of a multinational Outsourcing-Service Provider in charge of new businesses in South East Asia, 
Australia and New Zealand, who has committed to contribute to this study under a confidentiality clause. 
Second, while the majority of outsourcing research investigates the management of outsourcing projects, this 
study investigates the initial bidding stage of an outsourcing contract.  How accounting and non-accounting 
factors play a role in assisting outsourcing service providers to either accept or reject outsourcing contracts is 
not sufficiently discussed in the literatures. Finally, this study investigates the possibility that asset specificity 
changes over time. Although asset specificity has frequently been cited as a key factor that affects the nature 
of outsourcing relationships (Grover et al., 1996; Roodhooft and Warlop, 1999; Arnold, 2000), little research 
has documented the nature of asset specificity in relation to IT outsourcing engagements. Extant literature 
describes certain engagements as highly asset specific, but have not analysed whether this highly asset 
specific nature changes over time. It is important to note that these findings are limited to large IT 
outsourcing engagements, and cannot be generalised to smaller outsourcing engagements of smaller or 
different industries without further research.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  A literature review and theory development of key 
concepts and their relationships is conducted in the next section.  Subsequently, insights gained from the 
relationships posited are used to form propositions.  Finally, the results pertaining to the propositions are 
discussed, with concluding comments and suggestions for further research recommended. 
 
 
Literature Review & Theory Development 
 
Klepper (1995, pp. 257) states, “in the future an effort should be made to combine elements of several 
theories to obtain a better understanding of the mechanisms by which partnerships evolve…” (Kern and 














outsourcing decision and to analyse IT outsourcing relationships. Gilley and Rasheed (2000) define an 
outsourcing relationship as, “an activity that is less common, representing the fundamental decision to reject 
the internalisation of an organisational function…a highly strategic decision that has the potential to cause 
ripple effects throughout the entire organisation”. This definition emphasises the fact that organisations forced 
to purchase products or services externally due to the absence of the option to generate them internally do not 
fall under the definition of outsourcing. The option to conduct that activity in-house should be present for an 
outsourcing organisation.  
 
Nature of Outsourcing Relationships 
 
A common pitfall in most industries is a poorly implemented outsourcing strategy (Klopack, 2000). 
Outsourcing relationships have been perceived to be similar to arm’s-length transactions on one extreme, and 
akin to strategic alliances on the other (Kern and Willcocks, 2000; Grover, et. al. 1996). The goal of both 
buyer and seller in outsourcing negotiations is to obtain the best possible outcome for their firm (Clopton, 
1984).  Interestingly, and paradoxically, a traditional buyer-seller relationship sees transacting parties trying 
to make gains at the expense of one another. From this perspective, parties transact for a short period of time 
and hence are focused on maximising one’s own gains from the transaction without considering the other 
party (Schurr and Ozanne, 1985). Grover et al., 1996 find that it is important for firms to go much further than 
the transient buyer-seller association in order to achieve strategic, economic and technological benefits from 
IT outsourcing overall, for all parties involved in the process.  
 
An outsourcing venture may thus achieve cost savings, increased service levels and other objectives 
stipulated in the contract, via both parties looking beyond the traditional arm’s-length buyer-seller type 
relationship, and forging an increasingly cooperative and collaborative partnership operating within the ‘spirit 
of the contract’ (Kern and Willcocks, 2000). Collaborative engagements are at the other extreme of the 
relationship spectrum. An example of a collaborative alliance is a partnership. Henderson (1990) defines 
partnerships as “working relationships that reflect a long-term commitment, a sense of mutual cooperation, 
shared risks and benefits, and other qualities consistent with concepts and theories of participatory decision 
making”. 
 
In a partnership the parties involved are able to achieve key organisational objectives and build competitive 
advantage in their respective industries (Grover et al., 1996). Good partnerships are proposed as the key for 
successful outsourcing engagements (Livingston, 1992; Grover et al., 1996; Arnold, 2000;). In their study, 
Grover et al. (1996) find a strong positive relationship between IT outsourcing success and the partnership 
between outsourcing service-provider and outsourcer. The paper concludes that it is imperative for firms to go 
much further than a buyer-seller association in order to achieve strategic, economic, and technological 
benefits from outsourcing. They also state that it is important to cultivate a partnership with the outsourcing-
service provider at the outset of the engagement. At its best, collaborative efforts benefit from a healthy cross 
fertilisation of corporate cultures, skills, and resources that often lead to speedier and more effective outputs 
(Bello, Lohtia and Dant, 1999). Klopack (2000) supports these arguments by contending that the most 
effective relationships for outsourcing parties are long-term partnerships, because building strategic 
relationships takes time and investment and changing those relationships can be difficult and costly. A short-
term focus places stress on the outsourcing-service provider, resulting in poor performance because of 
inadequate time for the service provider to adjust to demand swings, to learn operation expectations and to 
establish a performance history (Klopack, 2000). Opportunism is a key behavioural assumption that drives 
transaction cost economic analysis (Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000). This concept refers to situations 
where entities behave in a manner that maximises their own perceived outcomes at the expense of others. 
Decision-makers are expected to act in the best interests of the entities they represent. However, under the 
umbrella of opportunism, the focus is on cost minimisation and profit maximisation at the expense of the 
other party in the engagement. Therefore, the decisions they make in determining the best direction for their 
respective entities are based on mainly available accounting information. Opportunistic behaviour is 
intensified in outsourcing relationships that are asset specific (Lonsdale, 2001). Asset specificity is discussed 





An integrative-distributive outsourcing typology is proposed in describing the nature of outsourcing 
relationships (Grover et al., 1996). This is a behavioural typology sourced from the Network/Interaction 
Industrial Marketing Theory investigating organisational motivations for inter-organisational interaction. This 
theory models the behavioural aspect of buyer-seller interactions along two principal dimensions (Schurr and 
Ozanne, 1985). First of the two typologies is the integrative-outsourcing typology. Extant literature associates 
higher levels of trust with the integrative interaction typology and lower trust levels with the distributive 
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interaction typology (Schurr and Ozanne, 1985; Grover et al., 1996). Integrative relationships are 
characterised by cooperative behaviour directed towards finding methods of satisfying the objectives of both 
the buyer and seller (in this case, the outsourcing-service provider and outsourcer) (Grover et al., 1996). 
These relationships rely on factors like trust and openness in extended buyer and supplier dyadic exchange 
relationships (Lonsdale, 2001). Here, the parties involved give more importance to the factors like the 
reputation and the trustworthiness of their respective partner(s). Due to the fact that they are formed with a 
view of achieving mutual goals, integrative relationships form the base for relationships that are long-term in 
nature (Grover et al., 1996). The network/interaction theory emphasises the importance of forming long-term 
engagements to establish a smooth working relationship (Grover et al., 1996). With regards to long-term 
relationships, McKenna (1985) states that it is necessary to “gain understanding of the market structure, then 
develop strategic relationships with other key companies and people in the markets. They must build 
relationships with suppliers and distributors, investors and customers. Change in the market can alter prices 
and technologies, but close relationships can last a lifetime, if not longer” (as quoted in Grover et al., 1996). 
The strong relationship between partnership and IT outsourcing success as observed by Grover et al. (1996) 
indicates that fostering a long-term integrative relationship based on social capital factors is critical to 
achieving the greatest benefits from outsourcing. 
 
The second of the two extremities is the distributive-outsourcing typology. Distributive relationships are 
characterised by parties being mainly concerned with their self-gain, even at the expense of the other party 
(Schurr and Ozanne, 1985; Grover et al., 1996). The main factors that are focused on in these relationships 
are cost and profitability. These relationships are usually short term in nature. A prudent deduction from the 
aforementioned arguments would see outsourcers and outsourcing-service providers being more concerned 
with the cost factors when dealing with highly specific outsourcing activities. Hence, it would be safe to 
conclude that the decisions made with respect to highly specific outsourcing activities will predominantly rely 
on As the accounting system is able to measure this risk, it is considered important. Although, accounting 
numbers are important and used in virtually all pre-contractual business evaluations, it is posited that 
evaluations that solely rely on accounting numbers are mainly concerned with the costs factors associated 
with the potential engagement and profitability of the potential alliance partner. Hence, parties tend to work in 
a competitive fashion where they are opportunistically trying to maximise their share of the profits from the 
engagement at the expense of the partner. As mentioned earlier, this mannerism is reflective of the 
distributive typology of outsourcing relationships.  
 
 
Asset Specificity  
Transaction cost economics emphasises the importance of asset specificity in considering outsourcing 
decisions (Grover et al., 1996; Roodhooft and Warlop, 1999; Arnold, 2000). Asset specificity is defined as 
being “the extent to which the investments made to support a particular transaction have a higher value to that 
transaction than it would have if they were redeployed for any other purpose (McGuinness, 1994 as quoted by 
Lonsdale, 2001). Asset specificity refers to the uniqueness of the product or service exchanged between the 
two parties involved in the outsourcing engagement (Grover et al., 1996) and this includes physical asset 
specificity, human capital specificity and site specificity (Aubert et al., 1996; Arnold, 2000). Physical assets 
consist of the apparatus required for the transaction completion, human capital specificity represents the 
learning and the knowledge parties need to acquire to participate in the exchange, and site specificity refers to 
the need for a party to be physically located near the other party to participate in the transaction. An 
outsourcing activity that is highly asset specific sees the outsourcing-service provider incurring additional 
costs in providing services to the outsourcer. The increase in cost is attributable to the fact that goods and 
services provided by the outsourcing-service provider are customised and are not readily transferable or 
useable in other transactions without huge additional costs (Grover et al., 1996; Arnold, 2000). In such cases, 
the service provider does not benefit from the usual economies of scale received from low asset specific 
outsourcing relationships. Maintaining low charge-out rates becomes a strain on the service provider because 
only activities with low specificity enable the service providers to bundle demand and exploit economies of 
scale (Arnold, 2000). Due to the uniqueness of a highly specific activity, the outsourcing-service provider 
needs to invest more in the provision of goods and services. Therefore, the additional costs incurred are 
passed on to the outsourcer in the form of higher service fees. Grover et al. (1996) found that the asset-
specific nature of many application projects could increase coordination costs significantly, reducing 
economies of scale and scope for the outsourcing-service provider, thereby making it difficult to realise the 
strategic, economic and technological benefits from outsourcing. Arnold (2000) states that it is sensible to 
avoid outsourcing highly specific activities by conducting them internally, in order to avoid extremely high 
market transaction costs.  
 
Roodhooft and Warlop (1999) found outsourcers to be more reluctant to enter an outsourcing contract that 
involved high asset specific investments due to imminent cost issues. The high asset specificity of an 
outsourcing activity demands substantial amounts of investment by the outsourcer at the outset of the 
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relationship and are forced to incur these costs if conducting the activity in-house is more expensive. This 
initial outlay is treated as a sunk cost. If an outsourcing firm decides to terminate the activity with one 
outsourcing-service provider and pursue a new outsourcing contract with another, the initial investment 
would have to be written-off and incurred again in the wake of the new relationship. Outsourcers generally try 
to avoid the termination of a highly asset specific activity. This hesitance can result in post-contractual 
dependency where the outsourcers are locked in the relationship to their service provider to avoid the 
additional costs involved in seeking a different service provider for the activity (Lonsdale, 2001). The 
arguments presented above suggest that the outsourcing of a highly specific activity cause a perceived 
disadvantage rather than an advantage to the parties involved and hence is regarded unfavourably.  
 
Due to the divergence in profit motives and the presence of factors like opportunism in a highly asset specific 
engagement, Kole (1983) emphasises the importance of hard contractual relationships (as quoted in Grover et 
al., 1996).  Ellram and Billington (2001) also emphasise the importance of contracts in governing 
relationships. 
 
Bidding & Negotiating  
 
A phase of contracting that is critical to the success of the endeavour is the bidding process (Nam, et al. 
1995). The selection of an appropriate outsourcing-service provider is also an important step in outsourcing 
that involves various issues. There are various service providers in the outsourcing marketplace, each 
possessing different strategies and service offerings. This creates an increasingly competitive environment 
amongst outsourcing-service providers who constantly bid and negotiate to win outsourcing contracts. Firms 
attempt to employ effective bidding and negotiating strategies because the outsourcer is in a position to take 
advantage of the competition amongst outsourcing-service providers (Nam, et al. 1995). It is usually the norm 
for outsourcing-service providers to have asymmetric expertise and cost structures. This is the by-product of 
one service provider possessing more information and expertise about the outsourcer than other service 
providers (Nam et al., 1995). Therefore, the process of contracting between entities will also involve costs. 
These cost are caused by information asymmetry, bounded rationality and opportunism (Arnold, 2000). Nam 
et al. (1995) found that a policy of giving incentives in the form of subsidies and forcing penalties in the form 
of discriminatory policies on to outsourcing-service providers allows an outsourcer to reduce contracting 
costs. They conclude that truth revelation strategies generally do better than and always at least as well as the 
blind strategy of picking the lowest bid.  
 
 Nevertheless, there is a degree of uncertainty and risk that even a well-drafted contract cannot mitigate (Nam 
et al., 1995). To minimise these risks, the outsourcing-service provider and the outsourcer must be aware of 
both, the benefits and risks of outsourcing and the specific factors that could lead to conflict (Vining and 
Globerman, 1998). To address these issues that arise during the process of contracting, the parties involved 
seek information regarding their prospective partners to assist them in the bargaining and contracting process. 
The findings of Nam et al. (1995) highlight the fact that it is important for an outsourcing-service provider to 
be equipped with as much information as possible about the outsourcer to gain a competitive advantage in the 
bidding and negotiation processes. They may rely on two different types of information which are 
quantitative criteria based on accounting numbers and/or qualitative criteria based on intangible factors 
(Agarwal, Tanniru and Dacruz, 1992).  
 
The literature has documented the importance of accounting information to decision making. This study 
however, explores the role of accounting and non-accounting information in the decision-making processes of 
IT outsourcing-service providers and observes the changes to the role of accounting and non-accounting 
information in decision making in the presence of certain factors believed to influence the nature of IT 
outsourcing relationships. The two information types are analysed in the following section. 
 
Types of Information  
 
A strong assumption of classical economic theory is that information is constant in availability for decision-
makers and that transacting parties possess the ability to measure the value of the elements exchanged. In 
outsourcing however, this is often proven false due to the existence of uncertainty measurement problems 
(Aubert, Rivard and Patry, 1996). ‘Uncertainty’ refers to the lack of information measurement ability and is 
observed through the difficulties encountered in the evaluation of an element of exchange (Aubert et al., 
1996). Agarwal et al. (1992) state that of particular salience to the problem of project selection decision is the 
consideration of both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the project. With regards to outsourcing-
service providers, each outsourcing engagement is treated as an individual project, and as mentioned earlier, it 
is important for them to equip themselves with as much information about the outsourcer as possible. More 
information enables them to structure more competitive bids for outsourcing projects (Agarwal et al., 1992; 
Nam et al., 1995; Aubert et al., 1996).  
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The information relied upon in decision-making may be quantitative or qualitative in nature. Quantitative 
information refers to mainly accounting data (Nguyen and Leblanc, 2001). Qualitative information refers to 
other factors such as trust and corporate reputation that are affected by mediums like advertising and word-of-
mouth (Nguyen and Leblanc, 2001). 
 
Accounting Information  
 
Past research has found that disclosure of accounting data is valuable in bargaining situations because it 
informs bargainers about the other party’s position thus reducing costly conflict (Luft, Haka and Ballou, 
1998). Properties of accounting information can increase or decrease the uncertainty associated with 
accounting-based payoffs (Haka, Luft and Ballou, 2000). In evaluating possible business relationships, 
transacting organisations rely on accounting information to ascertain the risk associated with the venture. The 
information content present in the accounting numbers assists these parties to avoid or limit each other’s 
exposure to high risk (Luft et al., 1998; Agarwal et al., 2000; Haka et al., 2000). It is posited that uncertainties 
in the accounting system offer opportunities for bargainers to act strategically (Luft et al., 1998). Therefore, 
the higher the risk associated to a transaction, the higher the reliance of transacting parties on accounting 
information. 
 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned, it is important to note that decision-makers cannot rely solely on 
quantitative accounting information to assist them in their decision-making processes. This view sources from 
the Social Capital Theory (Ireland, Hitt and Vaidyanath, 2002).  
Typically, in a situation where all aspects of a system are considered simultaneously, there can be a tendency 
for decision-makers to weigh the quantitative or concrete criteria more heavily than qualitative and abstract 
criteria (Agarwal et al., 1992), simply due to the objectiveness of measurement. A possible consequence of 
such biased decisions is that prospective outsourcing projects are judged merely on the financial merit of the 
outsourcer rather various intangible factors that are not reflected in the financial statements. Qualitative 
information plays a vital role in decision-making processes associated with outsourcing engagements.  
 
Non - Accounting Information 
 
Social Capital Theory refers to organisational relationships where other important resources are also strongly 
considered in addition to accounting numbers (Ireland et al., 2002). These resources mostly refer to non-
accounting factors that can be acquired from information sources such as advertising, firm trustworthiness 
and reputation (Nguyen and Leblanc, 2001).  Decision-makers have a perception about their prospective 
partners and rely on those perceptions to form their decisions (Ireland et al., 2002). Many outsourcing-service 
providers do not just restrict themselves to the mere provision of services for their clients, but also take on a 
certain degree of risk, which is shared with the outsourcers (Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; Meer-Kooistra and 
Vosselman, 2000; Langfield-Smith and Smith, 2001).  
 
The two key attributes of Social Capital Theory are Corporate Reputation and Trust (Nguyen and Leblanc, 
2001; Ireland et al., 2002). Based on this theory, reciprocal trust and cooperation are perceived as mitigating 
factors of mere legal or financial types of control. Corporate reputation has received increased attention in 
strategic management literatures, as it is perceived to be an intangible resource providing sustained 
competitive advantage to organisations (Deephouse, 2000). Viewed as a mirror of a firm’s history (Nguyen 
and Leblanc, 2001), corporate reputation is formed as a process that accumulates the judgements of the 
various groups who interact with the firm over time (Milewicz, 1993). A firm’s reputation is constructed 
through its credible actions (Nguyen and Leblanc, 2001). Credibility is determined by contrasting what a firm 
says it will do and what it actually does (Nguyen and Leblanc, 2001). Therefore, a firm with a high-perceived 
credibility enjoys a favourable reputation, unlike a firm with low-perceived credibility. Good corporate 
reputations have been found to be very important in establishing and maintaining loyal relationships 
(Robertson, 1993 and Nguyen and Leblanc, 2001), subsequently allowing for lower costs (Deephouse, 2000). 
 
Trust is believed to be an important element in the formation of alliances. The presence of trust creates the 
optimal basis for a mutually beneficial relationship (Carayannis, Sulaiman and Radosevich, 2000). Trust is a 
variable that can be brought into play by parties taking the right actions and it may stem from previous 
contractual relationships between the parties or grow during a certain transactional relationship (Meer-
Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000). The presence of trust between cooperating parties is especially important in 
situations characterised by uncertainty and strong dependencies between parties owing to specific investments 
(Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000), as it leads to constructive dialogue and cooperative problem solving 
(Pruitt, 1981 as quoted in Schurr and Ozanne, 1985). As stated in Luft et al. (1998), accounting numbers have 
the potential to cause uncertainty, thus creating a higher probability for the implementation of poor decisions 
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The first and second propositions explore the alignment of asset specificity of outsourcing engagements with 
the two extreme relationship typologies of outsourcing. These propositions seek to establish the connection 
between asset specificity and the outsourcing typologies as suggested by Transaction Cost and 
Network/Interaction Theories. Asset specificity has been cited as one of the most important factors to be 
considered before parties venture into outsourcing engagements (Aubert et al., 1996; Arnold, 2000). High 
asset specific outsourcing activities make it difficult for service providers to maintain low costs. The absence 
of economies of scale escalates the investment outlay of the service provider to operationalise the outsourced 
activity. Due to the fact that it is important for service providers to ensure a profitable result from the 
outsourcing engagement (like any other profit-making organisation), the additional investments made are 
transferred onto the outsourcers in the form of service fees. Aware of this, the outsourcer also tries to 
minimise losses by seeking the service provider capable of charging the lowest fees. This creates a setting 
where both parties are focused on costs associated to the project. Each party tries to make opportunistic gains 
at the expense of the other. This circumstance makes it very difficult for the outsourcer and the outsourcing-
service provider to work as a partnership and attain mutual goals. Rather, the parties involved are more likely 
to transact at arm’s-length, akin to buyer-seller relationships where each party is only concerned about its 
own interests. There is very little room for the factors advocated by the Social Capital Theory to exist here. 
Based on the Network/Interaction Theory, such opportunism-induced characteristics are indicative of the 
Distributive Outsourcing Typology. Therefore, the first proposition suggests that High Asset Specificity IT 
outsourcing engagements will reflect the Distributive Outsourcing Typology.  
 
P1: High Asset Specific IT outsourcing engagements reflect the Distributive Outsourcing 
Typology. 
 
The second proposition associates Low Asset Specificity IT outsourcing engagements with the Integrative 
Outsourcing Typology. Based on arguments similar to those discussed earlier, a low asset specific activity 
reduces the pressure to maintain low costs for both the parties involved in the outsourcing engagement. This 
is attributed to the fact that outsourcing-service providers can replicate the services provided for low asset 
specificity activities and benefit from economies of scale because large numbers of clients have similar 
requirements. The reduced costs attributed to low asset specific activities are passed on as cost savings onto 
the outsourcer. In such circumstances, the parties are more likely to pursue partnership-type strategies where 
both, outsourcing-service provider and outsourcer work together towards achieving mutual goals. Although 
the economic consequence of the transaction is always the primary focus for any business dealing, factors like 
trust and corporate reputation in line with the Social Capital Theory are expected to play a more important 
role in a partnership as opposed to an arm’s-length relationship. Therefore, as suggested by 
Network/Interactions Theory, Low Asset Specific IT outsourcing engagements can be aligned with the 
Integrative Outsourcing Typology. Hence, the second proposition:  
 
P2: Low Asset Specific IT outsourcing engagements reflect the Integrative Outsourcing Typology. 
 
The third and fourth propositions explore the alignment of the duration of outsourcing engagements to the 
two extreme outsourcing typologies. In accordance with the Network/Interaction theory, these propositions 
connect the perceived length of a project to one of the outsourcing typologies. Long-term interactions are 
formed with a focus on working together for a prolonged period of time. To sustain successful operations 
throughout a long-term commitment, past research has emphasised the importance of considering non-
qualitative factors in addition to quantitative accounting factors. The greater duration of a long-term 
engagement causes an increase in the uncertainty associated to the project. As mentioned before, during the 
contracting phase, it is unrealistic to expect the parties involved to foresee all possible problems that could 
arise in the future. Moreover, an attempt to incorporate all possible issues that could arise in the future at the 
contracting stage would employ a lot of resources into research about the parties involved and their respective 
industries. These factors will cause the contracting costs associated with the outsourcing project to escalate. 
To avoid incurring the additional costs during the contracting stage, parties opt to implement flexible 
contracts (Nam et al. 1995). These contracts provide for making changes to the terms and conditions of the 
contract in the future with the consent of the parties involved. Proponents of the Social Capital Theory 
contend that such contracts require the presence of trust. The outsourcing-service provider would have to 
place a degree of trust on the outsourcer, vice versa, for them to commit to a flexible contract. In this case, to 
a degree, each party assumes that the other would not act deviously or abuse the trust. This assumption is in 
line with the Integrative Typology. It suggests that the outsourcing-service provider is not only focused on the 
profits derivable from the outsourcer, but also the long-term sustainability of their engagement, which 
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demands the presence of trust. Hence, the outsourcing-service provider is expected to act based on perceived 
reputation of the outsourcer. Behaviours like opportunism are not expected to be present. The interacting 
parties are expected to work towards attaining mutual goals. Therefore, the third proposition suggests: 
 
P3:  Outsourcing service providers consider non-accounting factors in evaluating the decision to 
accept an Integrative outsourcing contract .  
 
The fourth proposition associates the use of accounting numbers with the Distributive Outsourcing Typology. 
Distributive engagements are predominantly of a short duration and engaging parties are expected to be 
focused on making quick gains within a limited time frame. Unlike long-term engagements, parties in short-
term engagements to an extent are able to anticipate problems that may arise in the future, at the initial 
contracting stage. Provisions are included in the contract to control for undesired developments in the future. 
Like most business ventures, IT outsourcing engagements require investments at the outset and parties expect 
to receive returns on invested amounts within the course of the engagement. In short-term engagements, the 
time frame within which the outsourcing-service provider and the outsourcer can receive their returns is 
small. As a result, they are expected to focus solely on quantitative data and accounting numbers. Accounting 
information assists decision-makers in calculating the level of risk associated to an outsourcing project. 
Hence, factors advocated by Social Capital theory are not as prevalent in a short-term outsourcing 
relationship as compared to a long-term outsourcing relationship. Opportunistic behaviour is also expected to 
be more rampant in these relationships as the parties are driven by the short time frame to make quick gains. 
In line with suggestion of Network/Interaction Theory, such engagements would be described as being akin to 
the Distributive Outsourcing Typology. Therefore, the fourth proposition suggests:  
 
P4:  Outsourcing service providers consider accounting numbers in evaluating the decision to 
accept a Distributive outsourcing contract .  
 
The fifth and sixth propositions focus on outsourcing engagements after the outsourcing-service provider and 
outsourcer have formed the relationship, thus exploring the post contractual nature of IT outsourcing 
engagements. Past literature has consistently categorised outsourcing activities as high asset specificity and 
low asset specificity. The literature suggests that the level of asset specificity has to do with the complexity 
and the uniqueness of the outsourced activity. A highly asset specific activity is unique in nature and thus 
requires additional investments by the outsourcing-service provider. Moreover, the uniqueness of the activity 
does not allow the outsourcing-service provider to apply the same resources to other outsourcers. As a result, 
the outsourcing-service provider is deprived of the opportunity to exploit the economies of scale that is 
usually present with low asset specificity outsourcing projects. However, nothing to the knowledge of the 
author has been documented in IT outsourcing literature about the nature of asset specific projects. It is 
assumed that the asset specificity of an outsourcing project remains static throughout the duration of the 
engagement. As an extension to the main frame of research in this study, the nature of highly asset specific 
relationships overtime is also analysed. This study posits that, due to an exposure to the uniqueness of a new 
engagement, outsourcing-service providers are initially required to outlay large investments that render the 
engagement as highly asset specific, but this situation reverses once the outsourcing engagement is in 
operation. This view is based on the findings that IT outsourcing-service providers are technologically more 
superior and hence given time, would be able to device a cheaper alternative to conducting the outsourced 
activity at high costs. If supported, this would imply that high asset specific outsourcing engagements could 
possibly reduce in specificity over time, due to the competence of the outsourcing-service provider. By 
tapping into technological developments to lower investments in a project, the outsourcing-service provider is 
expected to move high asset specific projects towards lower specificity. Therefore, the fifth proposition 
suggests that the nature of Highly Asset Specific outsourcing relationships are not static and can change over 
the course of familiarisation between the two parties.  
 
P5: The nature of Highly Asset Specific outsourcing relationships is not static. 
 
The final proposition aims to test whether in the long-term, all IT outsourcing relationships will progress 
towards the Integrative Outsourcing Typology. The rationale behind this suggestion is that over the course of 
a prolonged time frame, i.e. in a long-term engagement, the transacting parties would be able to minimise 
costs efficiently and build a strong relationship based on the factors advocated by Social Capital Theory. 
Therefore, the sixth proposition suggests that in the long-term, all IT outsourcing relationships will reflect the 
Integrative Outsourcing Typology irrespective of the nature of the relationship at the outset of the 
engagement. 
 




Research Method   
 
This study was conducted in the format of a single exploratory case study. Yin (1989) defines a case study as, 
“an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context when the 
boundaries between the phenomenon and its context are unclear, and where multiple sources of evidence are 
used”.  A case study  is the favoured method of research for studies that need to make sure that the 
phenomena explored is not divorced form its context (Brownell, 1995), and its unique strength is the ability to 
deal with a full variety of evidence – documents, artefacts, interviews, and observations (Yin, 1989). Case 
studies enjoy a comparative advantage over experimental research because of the premium focus placed on 
intimate appreciation of the context of the phenomena (Brownell, 1995). Otley and Berry (1994) state, “the 
case study provides a vehicle by which theories can be generated and modified in the light of data”. Case 
studies are said to be particularly valuable where existing theories are inadequate or incomplete. This applies 
to the IT outsourcing literature because as is widely accepted by most researchers, the IT outsourcing 
literature is not well developed (Hendry, 1995; Grover et al., 1996; Willcocks et al., 1999; Kern and 
Willcocks, 2000). These factors justify the case study approach used to conduct this study. Schramm (1977) 
provides support to this study’s choice of research design by referring to case studies as a strategy that “tries 
to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what 
results”  (Yin, 1989). This study also explores the decision-making processes of an IT outsourcing-service 
provider. Therefore, Schramm’s explanation further affirms the appropriateness this study’s design to the 
research issue.  
 
Respondents   
 
The identities of the outsourcing-service provider and the respondents are kept confidential in line with the 
confidentiality stipulation agreed at the outset of conducting this study. Therefore, extreme care has been 
taken in describing the outsourcing-service provider (OSP)1. In the same vein, the Director participating in the 
interviews is referred to as Mr. X. OSP is a global services company providing strategy, implementation and 
hosting for clients managing the business and technological complexities of the digital economy. OSP 
provides consulting through to business process management and develops business solutions from concept to 
implementation and operation. The products and services offered through this line of business enable 
manufacturers to digitise their product lifecycles as a way to increase margins and grow revenues. OSP is one 
of the largest, best equipped and most advanced information technology services organisations in Australia 
and the Asia Pacific.  
 
As the Commercial Director of OSP, Mr. X is in charge of businesses for South East Asia, Australia and New 
Zealand. He leads a team that engages in all new business pursuits across South East Asia, Australia and New 
Zealand. This team is responsible for handling the financial diligence on new contracts, getting involved in 
the negotiations of outsourcing contracts, and the structuring of deals. Apart from the long-term outsourcing 
contracts, this group also manages other operations such as divestitures and acquisitions. The team is used to 
solve specific problems on specific accounts and clients. The team also is in charge of renegotiating contracts 
that are under performing. Mr. X is the primary source of information for this study. The two managers who 
participated in the surveys to corroborate or contradict the information provided by Mr. X are also high-
ranking personnel of the organisation. The first is the Commercial Manager South East Asia. The second is 
the Commercial Manager of Australia and New Zealand. These respondents are managers of sub-groups that 
are part of Mr. X’s group.  
 
Within the organisation, responses were obtained from three key individuals.  The first was a series of 
interviews with Mr. XThe second stage of data collection was the questioning of Mr. X’s two senior 
operational managers via a survey, to gauge their perceptions of the relationships discussed and investigate 
their consistency with Mr. X’s responses. 
 
Interviews are one of the most important sources of case study information (Yin, 1989). Through interviews, 
well-informed respondents are in a position to provide important insights into a situation. In this study, the 
key respondent, Mr. X, was interviewed with mostly open-ended questions. It would be more appropriate to 
refer to Mr. X as the key informant rather than key respondent. This is because in answering the questions, 
Mr. X proposed his own insights into certain occurrences that were then used to make further inquiries. Such 
informants are critical to the success of a case study (Yin, 1989). However, extreme care was exercised in 
structuring the questions that were to be asked in the interview. In addition, a survey was carried out to 
increase the rigour of this study. The survey method is discussed in the next section.  
 
                                                 
1 Here after, the outsourcing-service provider is referred to as OSP. 
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The survey was conducted to increase the reliability of the findings in this study. The questionnaires were 
answered by two managers in the organisation. A survey method is advantageous when the research goal is to 
describe the incidence or prevalence of a phenomenon or when it is predictive about certain outcomes 
(Brownell, 1995). Given this, it was opined that the use of a survey approach to complement the case 
approach reinforced the results obtained. The questionnaires were designed with a focus on individual 
outsourcing engagements that the managers have been in charge of. The rationale for this was to analyse how 
well the answers provided by Mr. X reflected the outsourcing engagements of the outsourcing-service 
provider and also to seek the viewpoint of the actual managers of the outsourcing engagements. Most 
questions required answers over a 7-point Likert scale. The reason for selecting a 7-point Likert scale as 
opposed to the usual 5-point scale was to allow more variance in the results. A larger scale provides for more 
effective incremental observations. It is important to note, however, that both the case study and survey 
methods of research can be disadvantageous if not conducted properly. These pitfalls relate to biases during 
the interview process and the inappropriate or inaccurate completion of surveys by respondents. 
Notwithstanding this, it is noted that measures were taken in the administration of the interviews and surveys 
in this study to minimise the lack of reliability of data from the respondents. 
 
First, a consistent interpretation of the responses from the interviews and survey was facilitated via the use of 
simple instructions and questions that were worded to minimise difficulties associated with respondent 
interpretation. The respondents were high-level personnel who possess complete knowledge of the different 
activities and procedures within the organisation. Second, use of an alternate source of information (survey 
questionnaires), allowed a broader range of historical, attitudinal, and observational issues to be addressed. 
Most important is the development of converging lines of inquiry that allows any finding or conclusion in this 
case study to be much more convincing and accurate as it is based on different sources of information (Yin, 
1989). Third, a case study database was created in to ensure that all the sources of information that assisted in 
the deduction of results in this study were preserved. This prevents the researcher from resorting to making 
false claims that are unfounded. The presence of a database in the form of notes, study documents, tabular 
materials, narratives, and tape recordings as evidence further authenticates the results and findings of this 




The first proposition attempts to relate highly assets specific IT outsourcing engagements to the Distributive 
Outsourcing Typology. The interviews conducted with Mr. X revealed that although the financial position of 
the outsourcer was important, OSP also focused on non-accounting qualitative factors advocated by the 
Social Capital Theory. The following statement suggests this: “We prefer large clients; enterprise clients who 
have market leadership or a significant base of operation; we target the top 200 corporations in 
Australia…size is an important factor.” This statement shows that corporate reputation is an important factor 
influencing OSP’s decision making with regards to outsourcing engagements. Moreover, Mr. X revealed that 
OSP shares the risks attributable to the outsourcing project with the outsourcer:“We prefer all of IT; so we 
like to take-over the whole environment and manage the whole thing for the client (complete outsourcing), 
which will include hardware, software, people and all future application development requirements.” 
 
When the outsourcing-service provider takes over the whole of the environment for the client, there is a high 
degree of risk that it shares with the outsourcer. An organisation that bears a degree of risk along with its 
partner(s) characterises the Integrative Outsourcing Typology. Moreover, the following statement provided 
conclusive evidence that OSP’s relationships with its highly asset specific outsourcing engagements are 
reflective of the Integrative Outsourcing Typology:“We basically transfer any of the people who are in the 
in-house operation of the outsourcer into our organisation. Then, part of the process is to train them in the 
methodology of our organisation. We give them access to our experience and database and bring them up to 
speed with the operations. They then become resources that we can use on other accounts that we are going 
to win.” This statement suggests that OSP maintains a collaborative relationship with its outsourcing partners. 
Mr. X stated that OSP gives its clients' staff access to its database and also to details of its key operations. 
This evidently indicates OSP’s openness towards its clients and also affirms its willingness to work towards 
attaining mutual goals. The results from the interview thus do not support Proposition 1.  
 
As mentioned before, surveys were conducted to corroborate or contradict the information obtained from the 
interviews. The survey data were separated into two groups. The first comprised high asset specific 
engagements and the second, low asset specific engagements. The questions were structured to observe the 
factors that influenced the decisions of the outsourcing-service provider at the bidding, negotiation and 
management stages of specific outsourcing engagements. These results were collected from the two managers 
to increase the variety of the data sample and to collect evidence that either corroborates or contradicts the 
answers from Mr. X. 
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With respect to Proposition 1, the data obtained from the survey supported the results from the interview. 
Tables 1, 2 and 3 (see Appendix A), show the factors taken into consideration during the three stages with 
highly asset specific engagements and the evidence suggest that the relationships this IT outsourcing-service 
provider with its highly asset specific outsourcing engagements do not reflect the Distributive Outsourcing 
Typology. 
 
The mean values for the non-accounting factors during the Bidding Stage (Corporate Reputation and Previous 
Dealings) showed significant results. On a scale of 1 (Not Important) to 7 (Very Important), the Corporate 
Reputation variable had a mean of 5 and the Previous Dealings variable had a mean of 4.57, both above point 
4 (Moderately Variable). This suggests that non-accounting factors were considered important at the bidding 
stage of outsourcing engagements. The mean values for the non-accounting factors during the Negotiation 
Stage (Corporate Reputation, Previous Dealings, and Forging Long Term Relationships) also showed 
significant results. On a scale of 1 (Not Important) to 7 (Very Important), the Corporate Reputation variable 
had a mean of 4.86, the Previous Dealings variable had a mean of 4.57 and the Forging Long Term 
Relationships variable had a mean of 6.29. Again, the three variables had values above point 4 (Moderately 
Variable). This suggests that non-accounting factors were also considered important during the negotiation 
stage of outsourcing engagements. The mean values for the non-accounting factors during the Management 
Stage (Forging Long Term Relationships, Attaining Mutual Goals and Providing Saving to the Outsourcer) 
also unanimously show figures that are significantly above the Moderately Important point. The Forging 
Long Term Relationships variable had a mean of 6.71, the Attaining Mutual Goals variable had a mean of 
6.58 and finally, the Providing Savings to the Outsourcer variable had a mean of 6.58.  
 
Together, the importance of non-accounting factors in the three stages strongly supported the opinions of Mr. 
X. The importance shown for these non-accounting factors suggests that the relationships maintained by OSP 
with its highly asset specific outsourcing engagements were reflective of the Integrative rather than the 
Distributive Outsourcing Typology. Hence, Proposition 1 was not supported. It is important to note that the 
mean values for accounting factors were also above the Moderately Important level, indicating that 
accounting factors are significant regardless of the role of non-accounting factors. 
 
The second proposition relates low assets specific IT outsourcing engagements to the Integrative Outsourcing 
Typology. This proposition follows the argument that, when an outsourcing engagement is of low asset 
specificity, the outsourcing-service provider does not place too much of a focus on accounting numbers, as 
there is no high initial investments involved. Hence, the outsourcing-service provider was expected to place 
more emphasis on non-accounting factors in low asset specific engagements as opposed to high asset specific 
engagements. The answers given by Mr. X support this proposition. Mr. X claims the following: “We are 
certainly more relaxed when dealing with clients from industries that we have the expertise in simply because 
we know the investment required is not much, although there is still the focus on the Top firms in the industry, 
and the similar services apply.” This suggests that as expected, OSP considers factors advocated by Social 
Capital Theory with low asset specific engagements. It also suggests that OSP maintains similar standards of 
service to both types of outsourcing engagements. These findings support Proposition 2. To ensure that 
these deductions from the interview are accurate, the data from the survey is analysed. Here, the data set 
representing all low asset specificity engagements is observed.  
 
The evidence provided in Tables 4, 5 and 6 (not shown in this paper), show the factors taken into 
consideration during the three stages with low asset specific engagements and the evidence suggest that 
outsourcing engagements that are highly asset specific result in the firms behaving in a manner that reflects 
the Integrative Outsourcing Typology. 
 
The mean values for the non-accounting factors during the Bidding Stage (Corporate Reputation and Previous 
Dealings) supported Proposition 2. On a scale of 1 (Not Important) to 7 (Very Important), the Corporate 
Reputation variable had a mean of 5.11 and the Previous Dealings variable had a mean of 5.78, both above 
point 4 (Moderately Variable). This suggests that non-accounting factors were considered important at the 
bidding stage of outsourcing engagements. 
 
The mean values for the non-accounting factors during the Negotiation Stage (Corporate Reputation, Previous 
Dealings, and Forging Long Term Relationships) also showed significant results. On a scale of 1 (Not 
Important) to 7 (Very Important), the Corporate Reputation variable had a mean of 4.67, the Previous 
Dealings variable had a mean of 5.44 and the Forging Long Term Relationships variable had a mean of 6.67. 
Again, the three variables had values above point 4 (Moderately Variable). These results suggest that non-
accounting factors were also considered important during the negotiation stage of outsourcing engagements. 
 
The mean values for the non-accounting factors during the Management Stage (Forging Long Term 
Relationships, Attaining Mutual Goals and Providing Saving to the Outsourcer) also unanimously show 
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figures that are significantly above the Moderately Important point. The Forging Long Term Relationships 
variable had a mean of 6.67, the Attaining Mutual Goals variable had a mean of 6.78 and finally, the 
Providing Savings to the Outsourcer variable had a mean of 7.  
 
Together, the importance of non-accounting factors in the three stages strongly support the answers from Mr. 
X. The importance shown for these non-accounting factors suggests that the relationships maintained by OSP 
with its low asset specific outsourcing engagements were reflective of the Integrative Outsourcing Typology 
as expected. Confirming a concept introduced earlier in this study, accounting factors never lose their 
importance as is reflected by high mean figures for certain accounting factors as is shown in Tables 4, 5 and 
6. Nevertheless, the significance of non-accounting factors suggests that the relationships maintained by OSP 
with its low asset specific outsourcing engagements are also reflective of the Integrative Outsourcing 
Typology as was proposed in the second proposition. Therefore, the evidence obtained supports Proposition 
2. 
 
The third proposition relates long-term IT outsourcing engagements to the Integrative Outsourcing Typology. 
In this proposition, the argument is based on the notion that in a long-term engagement, the parties involved 
are aware of the prolonged commitment and see the importance of focusing on factors that can ensure a 
successful engagement. Thus, the outsourcing-service provider is expected to strongly consider non-
accounting factors advocated by the Social Capital Theory in addition to accounting factors. The interviews 
with Mr. X provide evidence supporting these claims. Mr. X claims the following: “The IT outsourcing 
contract that our organisation prefers is long term. This is because of the governance and monitoring that 
are required in contracts. Governance increases the overheads for a contract, so we prefer long-term 
contracts to ensure that clients will take a relationship based approach and you have more time to recover 
initial investments. That way, you can give savings to the client as well.” From this statement, it is evident 
that the outsourcing-service provider gives importance to fostering long-term relationships with its clients in 
which both parties will interact in a collaborative fashion. The focus on factors advocated by the Social 
Capital Theory for long-term outsourcing engagements is therefore significant. These findings support 
Proposition 3. Again, to ensure that the deductions from the interview were accurate, the survey data was 
analysed. As was done with the sample to observe the effects of asset specificity, the sample is divided into 
two groups; Short-term and Long-term to test propositions 3 and 4. Mr. X identified 3 years as the average 
duration of the contracts. Therefore, any engagement that lasted for more than 3 years was regarded long-term 
and any engagement lesser than 3 years was regarded short-term.  
 
Tables 7, 8 and 9 (not shown in this paper), like the previous tables present the factors taken into 
consideration during the three stages of long-term outsourcing engagements. The results corroborate the 
answers provided by Mr. X. It is evident from the results that in long-term engagements the relationships of 
the outsourcing-service provider reflect the Integrative Outsourcing Typology. The mean values for the non-
accounting factors during the Bidding Stage (Corporate Reputation and Previous Dealings) supported 
Proposition 2. On a scale of 1 (Not Important) to 7 (Very Important), the Corporate Reputation variable had a 
mean of 4.92 and the Previous Dealings variable had a mean of 4.67, both above point 4 (Moderately 
Variable). This suggests that non-accounting factors were considered important at the bidding stage of 
outsourcing engagements. The mean values for the non-accounting factors during the Negotiation Stage 
(Corporate Reputation, Previous Dealings, and Forging Long Term Relationships) also showed significant 
results. On a scale of 1 (Not Important) to 7 (Very Important), the Corporate Reputation variable had a mean 
of 4.67, the Previous Dealings variable had a mean of 4.75 and the Forging Long Term Relationships variable 
had a mean of 6.33. The three variables had values above point 4 (Moderately Variable). These results also 
suggest that non-accounting factors were considered important during the negotiation stage of outsourcing 
engagements. The mean values for the non-accounting factors during the Management Stage (Forging Long 
Term Relationships, Attaining Mutual Goals and Providing Saving to the Outsourcer) also unanimously show 
figures that are significantly above the Moderately Important point. The Forging Long Term Relationships 
variable had a mean of 6.67, the Attaining Mutual Goals variable also had a mean of 6.67 and finally, the 
Providing Savings to the Outsourcer variable had a mean of 6.75.  
 
The results therefore suggest that, again OSP considers non-accounting factors in addition to accounting 
information for its long-term outsourcing relationships. This is reflective the Integrative Outsourcing 
Typology. It is interesting to note that the mean values for the other accounting factors remain significant, 
reaffirming the fact that accounting information is never compromised in the decision-making processes of 
the outsourcing-service provider. Based on the evidence received from the surveys, Proposition 3 is 
supported. 
 
The fourth proposition relates short-term IT outsourcing engagements to the Distributive Outsourcing 
Typology. This proposition was based on the notion that in short-term outsourcing engagements, the parties 
are aware of the shorter period of commitment and see the necessity to make gains within the limited time 
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frame. Such behaviour is akin to an arm’s-length buyer-seller relationship that sees each party trying to make 
opportunistic gains at the expense of the other party. Thus, the relationship between the outsourcing-service 
provider and the outsourcer is expected to be tense and non-collaborative reflecting the Distributive 
Outsourcing Typology. Quite surprisingly however, both, the interviews and the surveys produced results that 
did not support this proposition. In the interview, Mr. X said the following about short-term engagements: 
“They are more tactical; you sign a short-term contract if you know that a client is going to move on to a 
larger outsourcing deal down the track and you want to establish the relationship and credentials so that you 
would have an inside running (working relationship with the outsourcer). This is because you know that the 
outsourcer has a huge IT spend and that one day you could capture a large chunk of that and that is a huge 
incentive. Even though we already have large long-term contracts with some banks, if the other banks even 
want a short-term contract, you always think that you could ultimately win a larger contract. Short-term is 
not the preferred model but it is considered as a tactic.” Interestingly, the statement shows that contrary to 
the proposition, a short-term engagement is actually perceived as the means by which OSP can win larger 
outsourcing engagements. Therefore, the short-term engagement is selected with as much care as a long-term 
engagement because it is treated as the platform that the outsourcing-service provider uses to establish a 
rapport with the outsourcer. This paves an opportunity for the outsourcing-service provider to forge a long-
term relationship in the future. This behaviour is reflective of the Integrative Outsourcing Typology.  
 
The survey results were analysed to find either corroborating or contradicting evidence from the managers 
with regards to short-term contracts. The results are shown in Tables 10, 11 and 12 (see Appendix A). The 
evidence from the surveys once again support the answers provided by Mr. X. The results show that in short-
term engagements the focus of the outsourcing-service provider very strongly reflects the Integrative 
Outsourcing Typology. The mean values for the non-accounting factors during the Bidding Stage (Corporate 
Reputation and Previous Dealings) supported Proposition 2. On a scale of 1 (Not Important) to 7 (Very 
Important), the Corporate Reputation variable had a mean of 5.5 and the Previous Dealings variable had a 
mean of 7, both very much above point 4 (Moderately Variable). This suggests that non-accounting factors 
were strongly considered important at the bidding stage of outsourcing engagements. The mean values for the 
non-accounting factors during the Negotiation Stage (Corporate Reputation, Previous Dealings, and Forging 
Long Term Relationships) also showed significant results. On a scale of 1 (Not Important) to 7 (Very 
Important), the Corporate Reputation variable had a mean of 5, the Previous Dealings variable had a mean of 
7 and the Forging Long Term Relationships variable had a mean of 6.5. The three variables had values above 
point 4 (Moderately Variable). These results also suggest that non-accounting factors were considered 
important during the negotiation stage of outsourcing engagements. The mean values for the non-accounting 
factors during the Management Stage (Forging Long Term Relationships, Attaining Mutual Goals and 
Providing Saving to the Outsourcer) also unanimously show figures that are significantly above the 
Moderately Important point. The Forging Long Term Relationships variable had a mean of 6.75, the 
Attaining Mutual Goals variable also had a mean of 6.75 and finally, the Providing Savings to the Outsourcer 
variable had a mean of 7. The results received from the surveys with respect to short-term outsourcing 
engagements had the strongest mean values for non-accounting factors indicating the significance of these 
factors. This also supported the views of Mr. X and suggests that the relationships maintained by OSP with its 
short-term outsourcing engagements strongly reflect the Integrative Outsourcing Typology. This finding is 
contrary to the fourth proposition. Therefore, Proposition 4 is not supported. 
 
The fifth proposition suggests that highly asset specific IT outsourcing engagements are not static in nature. 
Support for this proposition was found in the interview with Mr. X. The following statements provide 
evidence to the fact that an outsourcing engagement can start off as something that is highly asset specific, 
but over time, measures are taken by the outsourcing-service provider to ensure that it reduces in specificity. 
Mr. X states that the initial investments are high with highly asset specific engagements because of the 
outsourcing-service provider’s exposure to a new industry or activity. He states that OSP uses the resources 
of the outsourcer to gain new contracts thus reducing the specificity of the engagement. From the point of 
view of the outsourcing-service provider, this is one way by which the asset specificity associated to an 
engagement is reduced. The use of the outsourcer’s employees on other outsourcing engagements to increase 
revenues, balances off OSP’s high initial investments for the highly asset specific engagement. “We transfer 
the people who are in the in-house operation of the outsourcer from the new industry…. train that we are 
going to win them………they then become resources that we can use on other accounts” The next statement 
suggests that large IT outsourcing-service providers have the technology and know-how to overcome asset 
specificity issues quickly. Mr. X states that OSP has the technological competence to reduce the asset 
specificity of engagements. “However, we have enough technology and know-how to ensure that the asset 
specificity issue that we face is overcome as soon as possible to make the dealings between our clients and us 
better. So far, it has had positive results.” This shows that high asset specificity projects reduce in specificity 




The final proposition states that in the long-term, all outsourcing engagements will progress towards 
reflecting the Integrative Outsourcing Typology. This proposition was based on the notion that in the long-
term., the relationship between the parties in an outsourcing engagement would evolve into one that is 
reflective of the Integrative Outsourcing Typology. The interviews conducted with Mr. X, confirm this. In the 
following statement, Mr. X does acknowledges the fact that OSP may decide to engage in an outsourcing 
project based solely on the financial aspects of the outsourcer and the revenues the project will bring into 
OSP, although the outsourcer is thought to be untrustworthy. “If you have a client that meets all the 
requirements; large in size, large IT spend and growing in its environment, it doesn’t really matter whether 
they are trustworthy or not. You would do the deal and work on the relationship to make sure you fix it up. It 
is not a variable that you can easily gauge because management today is not management tomorrow. Why 
would you miss a commercial opportunity where you could contractually bind your partner at least in the 
short-run? It is true, that in the long-term, everything is based on your relationship, trustworthiness, etc, but 
they are abstract concepts that you work on.” An engagement with a sole focus on financial factors is 
reflective of the Distributive Outsourcing Typology. However, according to Mr. X, factors such as 
trustworthiness matter to sustain a relationship in the long-term. Upon further prompting, he explained the 
fact that the outsourcing-service provider would not miss out on a lucrative project simply because the 
trustworthiness of the outsourcer was in question. However, it is an important factor that will have to be 
worked on during the course of the engagement. Mr. X also states that in cases where attempts to build trust 
and collaborative interactions fail, the engagement goes bad and hence needs to be terminated.  He stressed 
that such a relationship would consequently affect the outsourcing-service provider in the long-term. Firstly, 
the management loses focus of lucrative engagements as the bad engagement could be a distracting factor and 
secondly, the outsourcing-service provider runs the risk of building a bad reputation for itself. These factors 
can affect the chances of the outsourcing-service provider to win potential outsourcing projects. The 
following statement suggests this: “There are plenty of situations where things are not working out and the 
problem cannot be fixed. When a contract is going bad, you need to very quickly fix the problem or get out of 
it immediately because staying in a relationship that is bad for too long takes away management attention, 
creates a bad reputation, and there are no winners. The unsatisfied client is just going to be talking to every 
other possible client. You can never make money on a bad contract.”  
  
Overall, the statements provide evidence that outsourcing engagements need to also focus on the factors 
advocated by Social Capital Theory in order to remain successful in the long-term. It is also clear that 
engagements that are unsuccessful in cultivating a collaborative relationship should be terminated to avoid 
undesired outcomes. These findings suggest that to survive in the long-term, IT outsourcing engagements 
should progress towards the Integrative Outsourcing Typology. Therefore, Proposition 6 is supported. This 
section presented the results upon testing each of the propositions presented earlier in this study. The results 
were discussed briefly with the presentation of evidence from the interviews and survey. The next section 
analyses and discusses these results and their implications in greater detail. 
 
Discussion of Results 
  
Propositions 1 and 2 explore the level of asset specificity associated with IT outsourcing engagements and its 
effect on the nature of the relationship between the outsourcing-service provider and the outsourcer. In 
accordance with theories and findings by previous research, Proposition 1 suggested that a highly asset 
specific outsourcing project will reflect the Distributive Outsourcing Typology. The rationale for this was that 
outsourcing-service providers do not benefit from economies of scale with highly asset specific projects. This 
is because, when the outsourcing-service providers are newly exposed to particular industries and/or 
activities, they do not possess the expertise to conduct those operations at low cost. The service provider 
therefore has to make large investments to acquire the technological know-how to conduct the operations. 
These additional investments deprive the service provider of the usual gains and as a result, these additional 
costs are passed on to the outsourcer. The outsourcer on the other hand reacts to the increases in expenditure 
by trying to reduce costs as much as possible. The two parties are thus expected to focus on cost reduction 
measures and try to make gains opportunistically out of the engagement at the expense of each other. Hence, 
their focus is proposed to be solely on accounting information about one another and not on factors advocated 
by the Social Capital Theory. This is reflective of the Distributive Outsourcing Typology. The results 
however, do not support this proposition. Interestingly, it was found that outsourcing-service providers were 
focused on factors advocated by Social Capital Theory in highly asset specific outsourcing engagements. The 
results show that the IT outsourcing-service provider favours and focuses on maintaining long-term 
collaborative relationships with its outsourcers, regardless of the asset specificity associated to the 
engagement. 
 
Proposition 2 is also supported by these findings. This proposition relates low asset specific IT outsourcing 
engagements to the Integrative Outsourcing Typology. As mentioned before, the outsourcing-service provider 
is equipped with the expertise to handle the technical requirements of low asset specific IT outsourcing 
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engagements and thus, does not need to make additional investments for the project. This allows the 
outsourcing-service provider to enjoy economies of scale because resources used on other outsourcing 
engagements can be deployed on the low asset specific engagement. The savings are passed on to the 
outsourcer as well. Therefore, both parties are more receptive to forging relationships that are directed 
towards attaining mutual goals. This reflects the Integrative Outsourcing Typology. In general, the results of 
this investigation suggest that in the large IT outsourcing market, the outsourcing-service providers use a 
more integrative approach to their outsourcing contracts irrespective of the asset specificity of the project. 
The discussions conducted with the Mr. X revealed that OSP actually seeks projects that are highly asset 
specific. He states that: “We look for industries in state of change…”The reason for this was that when an 
industry is going through change, companies in that industry is under threat either because of greater 
competition, substitutes, changing regulations or supply or demand markets. Under these circumstances 
management has more incentive to create change that will foster better performance, better results, and better 
savings. When questioned about the high initial outlays that are involved with highly asset specific projects, 
Mr. X said: “We invest before we have a client…and this is justified because when you are pursuing clients, 
you are not going to get that business unless you show that you have the expertise to solve their problems and 
run their operations well….we have a preference for clients who have an annual IT spend of between 50 and 
200/300 million dollars a year…..the key is the size of the revenue that we receive because being an 
outsourcing service provider, it is all about scale, and revenues are a proxy for scale. The larger the client, 
the bigger the revenue per year, the more you can do in terms of taking costs out of the system.”These 
statements revealed that the outsourcing-service provider actually perceived additional investments as 
necessary outlays that add value to the service provider’s position in the IT outsourcing market. Nevertheless, 
there was a strong level of importance placed on the financial standing of the outsourcer. This suggested the 
importance of accounting numbers in the decision-making process as the outsourcing-service provider is seen 
as being concerned about the financial clout of the outsourcer. However, further inquiry revealed that OSP 
also relied on non-accounting factors. Mr. X claimed that: “We prefer large clients; enterprise clients who 
have market leadership or a significant base of operation; we target the top 200 corporations in 
Australia…size is an important factor. We look for a client with healthy business models, we do not really like 
start ups, we look for a healthy credit rating, a sustainable growing business model, and we look for clients 
that are in the Top 3 in the industry.”These statements suggest that corporate reputation was also an 
important factor that influenced OSP’s decision in bidding for outsourcing projects. Moreover, Mr. X 
revealed that OSP shares the risks attributable to the outsourcing project with the outsourcer. “We prefer the 
all of IT so we like to take over the whole environment and manage the whole thing for the client (complete 
outsourcing), which will include, hardware, software, people, all future application development 
requirement.” 
 
These statements suggest that after venturing into a highly asset specific outsourcing project, the outsourcing-
service provider actually manages to derive large benefits by being able to deploy the assets of the outsourcer 
on other outsourcing projects within the same industry. Thus, the first project provides the service provider 
with the resources and expertise to start deriving economies of scale for projects within the same or a similar 
industry. The findings in regards to Propositions 1 and 2 reveal that OSP employs a uniformed strategy in 
bidding for outsourcing projects regardless of the asset specificity. Therefore, the level of asset specificity 
does not affect the nature of outsourcing relationships for large IT outsourcing-service providers.  
 
Propositions 3 and 4 explore the duration of IT outsourcing engagements and its association to the 
relationship between the outsourcing-service provider and the outsourcer. Literature on strategic alliance and 
outsourcing have described long-term engagements as relationships that are influenced by elements such as 
corporate reputation, trust, and collaborative interactions to ensure sustainability. These factors reflect the 
Integrative Outsourcing Typology. Therefore, Proposition 3 described long-term outsourcing projects as 
relationships that reflected the Integrative Outsourcing Typology. This proposition was supported, as it was 
found that the outsourcing-service provider favoured long-term engagements, which allowed transacting 
parties interact in a collaborative fashion. The following statement further supported this result:“Typically, 
the contracts are between 3 and 10 years, and in a large infrastructure environment the investment that is put 
in and then to try and derive savings out of the environment, you would need a long-term to get the payback 
for yourself and give your clients savings. It is important to then form a collaborative approach to ensure that 
the engagement can survive into the long-term.” With respect to the duration of outsourcing engagements, the 
results did not support Proposition 4. In line with extant literature, this proposition connects short-term 
contracts to the Distributive Outsourcing Typology. In short-term contracts, the parties involved are expected 
to try maximising their gains in the short period of time without focusing on the other party involved. Due to 
the time-constraint in such engagements, the transacting parties were expected to not behave in a 
collaborative fashion. Interestingly, this proposition was not supported. The results suggested that the 
outsourcing-service provider treated short-term contracts similarly to long-term contracts. Although the focus 
of decision-makers were expected to be solely on quantitative accounting factors, the results indicated that 
significant focus was also placed on factors like corporate reputation, trust, and collaborative interactions. 
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The reason for this was that the outsourcing-service provider engages in short-term contracts and treats those 
contracts as investments for the future, where the service provider is able to use the good relationship formed 
in the short-term contract to win long-term contracts from clients. 
 
Propositions 5 and 6 were extensions of Propositions 1 to 4. The interesting finding with regards to 
Proposition 5 was that the high asset specificity of an outsourcing engagement is not a factor that is static in 
nature. The results suggested that upon contracting, the outsourcing-service provider employs its resources to 
efficiently develop the technological competence to reduce the specificity associated with the project. Also, 
the service provider uses resources from the highly asset specific engagement on other outsourcing 
engagements. This additional revenue earned balances-off with the initial high investments. Therefore, the 
high asset specificity of such engagements is reduced over time. 
 
The results supported Proposition 6, which proposed all outsourcing relationships to reflect the Integrative 
Outsourcing Typology in the long-term. The interviews revealed that there are instances when the 
outsourcing-service provider engages with an outsourcer who may not have been thought to be trustworthy. 
The outsourcing-service provider was prepared to do so in view of the potential revenues that could be 
derived from the engagement. While this is reflective of the Distributive Outsourcing Typology, the 
respondent (Mr. X) made it clear that for a relationship to last into the long-term, efforts would have to be 
undertaken to ensure that the parties operate in a more collaborative fashion. This would require the parties to 
build trust and focus on attaining mutual goals. If unsuccessful to do so, Mr. X stated that the engagement 
should be terminated because it could affect the future operations of the parties involved. This suggests that in 
the long-term, the relationship between parties in IT outsourcing engagements will possess characteristics 
reflecting the Integrative Outsourcing Typology. 
  
Additional analysis was conducted on the survey data to increase the rigour of the reported results. The mean 
values of quantitative accounting and qualitative non-accounting factors considered by OSP at the three 
stages of its engagements were calculated for the total sample. The results are reported in Tables 13, 14 and 
15. The observation of the factors considered in the decision-making processes for the whole sample indicate 
that at the bidding stage, all variables, accounting and non-accounting were above the moderately important 
point (4) except the Outsourcer Financial Stability variable. The results are similar in the negotiation and 
management stages. It seems that there is very little difference between the perceived importance of 
accounting and non-accounting factors in the decision making processes of OSP, as indicated by the mean 
values. This suggests that the relationship of OSP and its outsourcers reflect the Integrative Outsourcing 
Typology.  
 
However, the results above were based on simple mean values. A widely accepted limitation of such values is 
that it gives equal importance to all items in a sample (Gupta, 1997). It is important to note that there are 
cases where the relative importance of the different items is not the same (Gupta, 1997). Likewise, the survey 
sample of this study had a group of 16 outsourcing engagements with different characteristics and 
requirements. Hence, the revenue received from each of those engagements also varies significantly. It is 
therefore reasonable to assume that each engagement would have a different level of significance to OSP. 
Based on the amount of revenue contributed to OSP, each outsourcing engagement is given a weightage. The 
‘Weightage’ of each engagement is the percentage of each engagement’s contribution to the total revenues 
OSP receives from the 16 engagements in the sample. The weightage of each outsourcer is then used to 
compute weighted mean values of each variable during the bidding, negotiation and management stages of 
each outsourcing engagement. This provides a more accurate depiction of the significance each factor in the 
decision-making process (Gupta, 1997). 
 
Table 16 lists the engagements and their respective weightage based on contributed revenue. Tables 17, 18 
and 19 list the 16 engagements with their computed weighted mean values for each variable in the bidding, 
negotiation and management stages. These results show that during the bidding stage, all factors are 
significant to the decision-making process. The non-accounting factors like Corporate Reputation of 
Outsourcer and Previous Dealings with Outsourcer have very significant weighted mean values: 5.58 and 
4.57 respectively. At the same time, the accounting factors like Outsourcer Size, Outsourcer Profitability and 
Expected Profits also showed very significant values: 6.58, 5.03, and 5.87 respectively. In the negotiation 
stage, a similar trend is seen with factors like Project Size, Project Revenue. Expected Profit, Corporate 
Reputation of Outsourcer, Previous Dealings with Outsourcer, and Forging Long-term Alliance showing 
significant mean values: 6.17, 6.60, 5.45, 5.01, 4.58, and 6.76 respectively. The management stage also shows 
similar results with strongly significant weighted mean values for all factors. Here, the values were above 
6.85 for four out of the six factors. Three of those four factors were non-accounting factors (Forging Long-
term Alliance, Attaining Mutual Goals and Providing Savings to Clients). The two factors with values below 
6.85 were Increasing Size of Project and Minimising Investment, and although their values were lesser than 
the other factors in the management stage, they were still significant (6.35 and 5.72 respectively). An 
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observation of the scores for individual engagements in Table 17, 18 and 19 also indicate that the differences 
between the significance of accounting and non-accounting factors are negligible Together, the results 
suggest that both, accounting and non-accounting factors are significant in the decision-making processes of 
OSP.  The next section discusses the nature of the outsourcing relationships between OSP and its outsourcers 




At the outset, it was stated that this study explored the decision making processes of IT outsourcing-service 
providers at various stages of outsourcing engagements to understand the nature of its relationships. The 
results presented in the sections above explored the factors that were considered at the bidding, negotiating, 
and managing stages of outsourcing engagements. No observation however, was made with regards to the 
termination stage of outsourcing engagements. This was due to the fact that, the sample of 16 engagement 
observations had only 2 terminated engagements. A contributing factor this low number of termination of 
contracts is OSP’s ability to retain its outsourcing contracts. When asked about this, Mr. X stated that a large 
majority of OSP’s clients were highly satisfied with the service provider and usually extended the duration of 
engagement. Although relatively small, this small sample of terminated engagements does provide some 
insight into the nature of the OSP’s outsourcing relationships at the termination stage.  
 
Of the two contracts, one terminated on stipulated contract termination date and the other after the stipulated 
contract termination date. This may be taken as an indicator that the outsourcers and OSP were satisfied with 
the engagement and the collaboration yielded positive results causing the parties to extend the duration of 
their engagement. To support this suggestion further, the answers to Questions 21 and 22 revealed that OSP 
provided support services to the outsourcers even after the termination of the engagement. When questioned 
in the interview regarding terminated engagements, Mr. X said the following: “Within the contractual 
framework, we have a number of clauses stating that we will offer all the assistance to transition back the 
people and assets without disruption to services of our clients. We would of course be paid for that and we 
would extend that continuity of service and assistance even if they were to outsource to another service 
provider. This is not something that we have to do, but it is done to emphasise our focus on forming 
partnership-type relationships.” This statement strongly suggests that OSP’s relationships reflect the 
Integrative Outsourcing Typology. An important point made by Mr. X was that, the support services provided 
to outsourcers by OSP were done even if the service provider was aware that the outsourcer was getting into a 
contract with a competitor. Such display of collaboration and trust strongly reflect the Integrative Outsourcing 
Typology.  On the whole, the results from the interviews with Mr. X and the survey data suggest that OSP’s 




The results in this study are significant because of its focus on asset specificity, in relation to the types of IT 
outsourcing typologies.  Further, the role of accounting and non-accounting information in assisting OSP’s 
make decisions regarding outsourcing contracts was theorised, proposed and tested.  A case study research 
methodology was employed to operationalise this study and data was collected from interviews and a survey. 
The respondents were high-level staff of a multinational IT outsourcing-service provider who obliged to 
participate in this study under a clause of confidentiality. 
 
Of the six propositions proposed, the first two explored the effect of the asset specificity on the nature of IT 
outsourcing relationships. High asset specific IT outsourcing engagements were proposed to reflect the 
Distributive Outsourcing Typology in Proposition 1, while low asset specific IT outsourcing engagements 
were proposed to reflect the Integrative Outsourcing Typology in Proposition 2. The results did not support 
Proposition 1, but supported Proposition 2. This suggested that asset specificity was an important factor but it 
did not influence the orientation of the large IT outsourcing-service provider towards working in a 
collaborative fashion.  
 
The next two propositions analysed the utility of accounting and non-accounting information on the 
distributive and integrative outsourcing typologies respectively. Proposition 3 aligned the use of  non-
accounting information to the Integrative Outsourcing Typology decision making process, while Proposition 
4 linked short-term engagements to the Distributive Outsourcing Typology. The results supported Proposition 
3, but did not support Proposition 4.  This suggests that in both circumstances, large IT outsourcing-service 
providers maintained a collaborative approach with its outsourcing engagements. This conclusion, to a large 
extent, proposes an alternative solution to the usual relationship between the respective typologies and the 
relative utilities of accounting and non-accounting information in relation to them.   
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In Proposition 5, high asset specific engagements were proposed to reduce in specificity over time. To the 
knowledge of the authors, nothing has been documented about the variability of asset specificity in the IT 
outsourcing literatures, over a period of time. Though asset specificity has been frequently cited as a vital 
factor influencing the outsourcing decision, it is interesting that much research ignores its dynamic nature, 
assuming it to be a static condition. The results supported this proposition suggesting that high asset 
specificity IT outsourcing engagements involving large outsourcing-service providers are not static in nature, 
largely due to the increased pervasiveness of technology with the advent of time, thus lowering the specificity 
of assets.  
 
The findings with respect to asset specificity interestingly highlighted the fact that asset specificity does not 
affect the manner in which a large IT outsourcing-service provider approaches its outsourcing engagements. 
Although researchers have found that outsourcing parties are reluctant to enter highly asset specific 
engagements, the findings in this study indicate that the large IT outsourcing-service provider perceive highly 
asset specific projects as opportunities for it to gain new clients in a relatively new industry environment. The 
service provider thus stands the chance of gaining competitive advantage over its competitors in that industry. 
As a result, the IT outsourcing-service provider uses measures to reduce the specificity of an outsourcing 
engagement to be able to attract more clients of that nature. This revealed that asset specificity of an IT 
outsourcing engagement is not static in nature when it involves large IT outsourcing-service providers 
because it is reduced it over time. However, this finding may apply to large IT outsourcing-service providers 
only. Due to their financial capacity, the large service provider is equipped with the competence to efficiently 
seek measures of reducing the specificity of an engagement. This may not necessarily be the case with 
smaller IT outsourcing-service providers. 
 
 
Overall, the results suggest that large IT outsourcing-service providers (OSP) value non-accounting factors in 
their decision-making processes reflecting the Integrative Outsourcing Typology. Contrary to the findings of 
many researchers, the outsourcing-service provider adopted an integrative approach to its relationships as 
opposed to a distributive approach even in engagements that were highly asset specific, and short-term in 
duration. This finding further validated the fact that factors advocated by the Social Capital Theory such as 
corporate reputation, trust and collaborative interactions are crucial in IT outsourcing relationships. More 
broadly, via the use of a case approach, and within this setting, it is shown that the use of qualitative factors 
and their related management and psychological theoretical underpinnings as advocated in many management 
accounting literatures, do play a role in the decision making processes of what, on the surface, appears a 
purely financial decision.  Notwithstanding this, the importance of accounting information was never 
compromised under any of the circumstances. All results suggested that accounting information is vital to the 
decision-making processes of IT outsourcing-service providers and that non-accounting information serves as 
an additional and important contributor to accounting information in the decision making process. 
 
Limitations and Implications for Future Research 
 
Although this study provides unique and interesting insights that are absent from some previous research, it 
has its limitations in regards to its results and contributions. First and most important is the fact that the scope 
of this study was limited to one IT outsourcing-service provider. Yin (1989) states that case studies, like 
experiments are generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes. The objective 
here is to expand and generalise theories (analytic generalisation) and not enumerate frequencies (statistical 
generalisation) (Yin, 1989). Therefore, the main limitation of this study is its inability to generalise its 
findings. This has been widely acknowledged as a major barrier in doing case studies (Yin, 1989; Brownell, 
1995). 
 
To understand the relationship between an outsourcing-service provider and outsourcer, the case study is one 
of the best research methods (Yin, 1989). While this research method presents the best setting to analyse a 
phenomenon in its natural setting, it is not easily generalised.  With regards to this study, the IT outsourcing-
service provider was a large multinational organisation. At best, the results of this study could have similar 
implications to organisations of similar size and scale of operations. The results may not be generalised to 
smaller IT outsourcing-service providers because the technological and financial advantage present with the 
larger service provider may not be present for smaller service providers.  To be generalised, repeated studies 
would have to be conducted on two or more outsourcing-service providers to assess if the results are expected 
to occur (Yin, 1989). Based on the replication logic, the results from conducting such replications can be 
accepted for a much larger number of IT outsourcing-service providers. Firstly, future research should study 
the relationships of another large IT outsourcing-service provider to ensure that the results of this study is not 
organisation specific and that it can be extended to organisations of similar scale.  
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As mentioned before, this study suggests that the asset specificity of IT outsourcing engagements is a factor 
that is not static. The results indicate that the high asset specificity of outsourcing engagements is variable in 
nature. However, this study has relied on the interview results to support this proposition. Future research 
should explore this finding further by conducting a more detailed experimentation of the nature of asset 
specificity with regards to IT outsourcing projects and also other types of outsourcing projects.  
 
Implications for Industry   
 
This study has strong implications for managers in the IT outsourcing industry. The results suggest that the IT 
outsourcing-service provider in this study is focused on forming collaborative relationships. Other IT 
outsourcing-service providers should also resort to forming more collaborative relationships with their clients. 
When an outsourcing relationship reflects the Integrative Outsourcing Typology, the parties involved are able 
to engage in a more relaxed fashion and assist each other in attaining mutual goals. Moreover, the findings in 
this study support the claims by research on outsourcing relationships that such alliances produce significant 
long-term benefits to all parties involved.  
 
Outsourcers on the other hand should have more realistic expectations from the outsourcing-service 
providers. Outsourcers should realise that the outsourcing engagement can produce more benefits if all parties 
engage with a collaborative attitude. It is also important for the outsourcer to realise that the service provider 
is also an entity that needs to make profits to survive. Collaborative interactions with a focus on attaining 
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